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We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (A Council on Foreign Relations Book) ReviewWe Now Know by John Lewis Gaddis is a preliminary reevaluation of the first half of the Cold War (roughly 1945-62) based on information from the Soviet side that has become available since the demise of the Soviet Union. After presenting a wealth of material, Gaddis offers eight tentative hypotheses:1.Diversification of power did more to shape the Cold War than did the balance of power. The Soviet Union rivaled the west in military power but lagged significantly in every other dimension, such as economic, cultural, moral, and ideological.
2.Both the US and Soviet Union built empires during the Cold War but they differed significantly. The Western European nations actively sought US support and involvement in the post-WWII years, leading to NATO and the Marshall Plan. In contrast, the Soviet Union had to put down numerous active revolts by members of the Warsaw Pact.
3.Many people did see the Cold War as a contest between good and evil, even if historians rarely did. Thousands of East Germans voted with their feet immediately after WWII, again in the 1950s (leading to the construction of the Berlin Wall), and again in 1989 (when Hungary opened its borders).
4.Democracy proved superior to autocracy in maintaining coalitions. Gaddis observes that many attributes of a nation's internal politics carry over into its foreign policy. The US was able to maintain its coalition by applying the consensus building techniques used domestically to managing its coalition. The Soviet Union's approach to coalition building, based on its approach to domestic politics, achieved unity within the Warsaw Pact only by smothering dissent.
5.Marxism-Leninism fostered authoritarian romanticism. At the end of WWII, Stalin believed that the next war would be between competing capitalist nations, that the workers of the world would unite, and that all the Soviet Union needed to do was to wait for capitalism to self-destruct. He failed to realize that his aggressive moves into central Europe had united the capitalist nations against him.
6.Nuclear weapons exchanged destructiveness for duration. Nuclear weapons rendered direct military conflict between the US and Soviet Union untenable, even in the years when the US had an overwhelming nuclear superiority. The result was that the Cold War continued unabated until the late 1980s.
7.As long as Stalin was running the Soviet Union, the Cold War was inevitable. If one imagines the changes in history that might have resulted from removing one key individual, the only such change that might have prevented the Cold War appears to be the removal of Stalin. His unique position is due to both his absolute power over the Soviet Union and his aggressive policies, exemplified by his moves into central Europe, his encouragement of Kim Il Sung to invade South Korea, and pressure on Mao to intervene when the US/UN forces had defeated the North Koreans. In contrast, removing any one western leader would not have produced any significant change in the course of events.
8.Future Cold War historians should retain the capacity to be surprised. Gaddis modestly observes that his book is not likely to be the final word on the Cold war.
One striking aspects of We Now Know is the description of "Potemkinism" and the impact it had on (1) the Soviet Union, (2) the US, and (3) the Soviet allies. (A Potemkin Village is a façade: An apparently prosperous village consisting of nothing more than building fronts and props built solely to impress the Tsar.) (1) In the face of US military superiority after WWII, the Soviet leadership repeatedly exaggerated its military strength. Waves of bombers flying over the Kremlin in conjunction with parades circled back and flew over again to create the impression of tremendous air power. Khrushchev repeatedly boasted about the superiority of his missiles and nuclear warheads when, in fact, he had very few available. This bluff was designed to deter the US by concealing the actual weakness of the Soviet Union, but Khrushchev failed to anticipate the potential reactions by the US and his allies. (2) In the US, the bluff prompted the "missile gap" debate that figured prominently in the 1960 presidential election and provoked a major effort to "catch up" with the Soviets. The Soviets were then forced to commit more resources to expanding their strategic capabilities in the face of actual American superiority and the arms race was underway. (3) Several Soviet clients also believed the bluff and acted more aggressively because they relied on Soviet military superiority to back them up. This pattern contributed to Kim Il Sung's invasion of South Korea, the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, and Castro's aggressive stance during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.
We Now Know focuses on the first half of the Cold War, so it is unfair to criticize it for not addressing how and why the Cold War ended. Gaddis offers a few hints related (1) the impact of the change in US policy under Reagan from containment to challenging the Soviets across the spectrum of power (military, economic, moral, cultural, etc) and (2) the numerous changes in Soviet policy under Gorbachev, glasnost, creation of democratic institutions, and especially, the decision not to intervene when the Berlin Wall came down.
Perhaps Professor Gaddis is working on a sequel to address the second half of the Cold War and, especially, its conclusion. I'll offer three gratuitous thoughts for this endeavor. (1) His comments on Gorbachev's impact on the Soviet Union and the Cold War are very much on the mark. Gorbachev was faced with the impossible task of reforming a monstrosity with no redeeming qualities. His willingness to allow the Soviet Union to die rather than return to the policies of Stalin and Lenin established him as the only Soviet leader who was truly a "Hero of the Soviet Union". (2) Gaddis' comment that it is not clear whether Reagan's policy change in the 1980s was out of "ignorance or craft" is a bit unfair. Moving to confrontation may have been risky (primarily in economic terms, since nuclear standoff was well established) but I think it was well thought out and executed. The challenge was extended primarily in the economic and moral dimensions of power where the Soviets were most vulnerable. I don't mean to give all credit to Reagan; I think Margaret Thatcher was his strategic and philosophical mentor in this and many other areas. (3) Finally, I'll offer some credit to Jimmy Carter who claimed the moral high ground for the US with his emphasis on human rights. His policies may have been largely ineffectual at the time (Iran, Nicaragua) but they laid the foundation for challenging the Soviet Union on moral grounds.
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